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Jail Incarceration and Violent Crime Rates: A cross-sectional exploratory analysis in
Albuquerque, New Mexico

Saundra Trujillo
The University of New Mexico
B.A., Sociology
ABSTRACT
A core idea in the collateral consequences literature is that incarceration
stimulates residential instability – a process referred to as coercive mobility – which in
turn weakens community social organization and elevates local crime levels. I test this
idea with an exploratory cross-sectional analysis of Albuquerque neighborhoods (20002001) using a general linear model with a negative binomial response function. Net of
rigorous controls I find that jail incarceration increases violent crime rates. Further I find
that the positive effect of jail incarcerations on violent crime is weakened at relatively
high levels of jail incarceration for majority Latino neighborhoods. Whereas, in non
Latino neighborhoods, jail incarceration increases violent crime at relatively low levels of
incarceration. By studying jail sanctions which are often shorter and for less serious
crimes than prison sanctions, this study is well positioned to provide a broader snapshot
of how our expansive criminal justice net has captured residents of many communities
for short-term punishment that has long term consequences.
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Introduction
For nearly thirty years, an increasing proportion of the population has experienced
jail incarceration. Yet, over these same years there has been a decrease in the rate of
reported crimes. This practice of incapacitating record numbers of criminal offenders has
been discussed at length in legal, criminological and penology literature.

As recently as

1992, The U.S. Office of Policy Development published The Case for More
Incarceration and argured that the United States needed to continue its tough stance
against crime by building more prisons and incarcerating more criminals in the name of
public safety (Department of Justice 1992). Since the late 1960s, politicians have run
campaigns founded on ―tough on crime‖ rhetoric. Indeed, local and national anti-drug
and crime policies have paved the way for the United States to be the industrialized
country with the largest prison population in the world (sentencingproject.org). This
move toward mass incarceration has prompted criminologists to assess the effects of a
mounting criminal justice system on a variety of macro outcomes. In general, research
shows that at the neighborhood level concentrated prison incarcerations yield high levels
of unemployment, high levels of poverty, familial breakdown, poor health outcomes,
political disenfranchisement and often increasing levels of crime (Carlson &Cervera
1992; Freeman 1992; Edin& Lenin 1997; Lynch and Sabol 2003, 2004; Pager 2003&
2007; King &Mauer; 2004; Pettit & Western 2004; Western 2006; Pager &Quillian 2005;
Thomas &Torrone 2006; Uggen et al., 2006; Mauer 2006; Clear 2007; Scheyett et al.,
2010). Such works have suggested that the expansion of severe criminal justice
sanctioning may have dire ―costs‖ to our communities. This literature sparked a debate
between the scholars who argue that incarceration potentially harms communities and
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decreases community safety versus those who argue that incarceration deters crime thus
making community life safer. The current work seeks to join the debate.
Much of the above literature on the relationship between criminal justice
sanctions and subsequent crime has focused on imprisonment and neglected the more
frequently imposed sanction of jail incarceration. The overemphasis on prison sanctions
is problematic because it may underestimate the extent to which the expanding criminal
justice net affects our communities. There are approximately 5 million more citizens
caught-up in the criminal justice system than what is reflected in prison incarceration
alone. Yet, to my knowledge, there is little research on how this has affected community
safety. Between 2000 and 2006, the average daily jail population increased by roughly
24% (Bureau of Justice Statistics; 2009). Jail incarceration is generally the second step in
the criminal justice sanctioning process; it occurs after criminal charges and arrest. As
such, jail incarceration is imposed upon those charged and/or convicted of less serious
crimes then subsequently released back into the community under probation supervisionrestrictions. Thus, jail incarceration captures the more frequent ―ins and outs‖ of
offenders. In contrast, prison sanctions aim to remove the most violent, dangerous
residents from the community for extended periods of time. What happens to a
community‘s level of violent crime when incarceration reflects the activities of less
serious, non-violent offenders including misdemeanor crimes such as traffic violations?
It may be that when coercive mobility reflects minor crimes it is particularly destabilizing
and crime producing.
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Figure 1 Here

The current project assesses the role played by jail incarceration rates in shaping
violent crime levels across 136 Albuquerque neighborhoods in the early to mid-2000s. It
contributes to the community, collateral consequences and crime literature in two ways.
First, previous research on the relationship between criminal justice sanctions and crime
has focused on imprisonment; in contrast, the current study specifically explores how
tract-level jail incarceration—the more commonplace criminal justice sanction-- affects
crime rates in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Second, Albuquerque has significant Latino
representation across neighborhoods. Specifically, forty-one census tracts of
Albuquerque‘s 136 tracts are more than 50% Latino. Sixty-one percent of
Albuquerque‘s majority Latino tracts also experience a high amount of jail incarceration.
While much of the incarceration literature has examined how incarceration effects
African American communities (Rose & Clear 1998; Clear et al., 2003; Renauer et al.,
2006; Clear 2007; Hipp & Yates 2009; Taylor et al., 2009), little research assesses its
impact on majority Latino communities. This study seeks to uncover the extent to which
jail incarceration differentially affects majority Latino communities as compared to non
Latino neighborhoods. It may be that the tightly knit social networks prevalent in Latino
communities facilitate their ability to withstand the pernicious influence of jail
incarceration, compared to non Latino neighborhoods often characterized by fewer social
ties. It also might be that the effect of incarceration becomes redundant in majority
Latino neighborhoods given their ―ceiling‖ or high levels. Whereas in, non Latino
neighborhoods, the ―floor‖ or low levels of incarceration means a little incarceration
3

yields a major increase in violent crime. Given the extensive direct and indirect reach of
the criminal justice system involvement into the lives of U.S. residents and a lack of
knowledge on how jail incarceration affects our communities, there is a need for
understanding whether and how it affects our communities regarding community safety
and crime.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, drawing on four general theoretical
perspectives, (two that suggest sanctions decrease crime, and two that suggest sanctions
may increase crime,) I derive hypotheses about the relationship between jail and crime.
Next I present the data and methods used for the current analysis. Finally, I explore the
results of the analysis, note limitations of the study and suggest avenues for future
research.
Four Frameworks on Community Safety and Imprisonment
Community and Procedural Justice suggest rising crime rates
Most criminological scholars agree that up to a point, criminal justice sanctions
such as incarceration can be beneficial for the community. As seen with some deterrence
and incapacitation arguments, criminal justice sanctions can potentially reduce crime in a
community for a short time. However, the community justice framework, or coercive
mobility hypothesis, expects that after a tipping point in the numbers of adult offenders
relocated to and from prison, mechanisms within the community are set in motion that
lead to an increase in crime over time thus reducing public safety. Coercive mobility
literature suggests that the missing variable in attempting to explain why some
communities do not to experience long-term positive, crime reducing effects of
incarceration is due to the number of incarcerated residents in the community itself.
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Mass imprisonment literature suggests that the incapacitation of the most serious
criminals generally increases public safety by removing the most dangerous criminal
residents from the community; however, after those offenders have been removed, the
subsequent instability created by continued residential sanctioning of less threatening
offenders harms important components of community organization (Taylor et. al., 2009).
Drawing on social disorganization and systemic theories, residential stability enables
communities to organize against crime via social networks within and outside the
community; residential stability also provides a basis for collective efficacy and effective
informal social controls (Shaw and McKay 1942; Bursik 1988). However, repeated
removal of adults from the community for criminal sanctioning may, ironically, disrupt
informal control mechanisms such as family formation, economic prospects, civic
participation and conventional social networking through strong and weak ties (Clear
2007; Renauer et al 2006; Hipp and Yates 2009; Taylor et al., 2009). In this way,
incarceration can be considered an adverse neighborhood condition similar to other noted
conditions present in socially disorganized communities such as poverty, unemployment,
residential mobility, and ethnic heterogeneity.
Coercive mobility, the residential relocation of accused criminals to and from jail,
often ensures that the same people who are removed from a community also return to that
community; this differs from the traditional conceptualization of residential instability.
The traditional conceptualization of residential instability has encompassed the
―assimilation of newcomers into the social fabric of local communities‖ that is temporary
but still a barrier to the generation and maintenance of social ties (Sampson & Groves
1989). However, returning probationers or parolees are generally not newcomers to the
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community. Often, probationers or parolees are returning to their community saddled
with the baggage of long-term consequences of criminal sanctioning that burdens the
community and strains conventional familial and friendship networks (Clear 2007,
Western & Wildeman 2009; Moore 1996; Renauer et al., 2006). Prison and jail
incarcerations cause a strain or break in strong and weak social ties (Clear 2007; Hipp &
Yates 2009). Upon release from jail or prison, the ex-inmate must be re-integrated into
community life. This process of reintegration rather than new integration is either one of
relief or a further strain on the community. Close family and friendship networks that
once depended on the incarcerated resident for support may be relieved by their return.
The return of a resident who faces long-term economic, emotional and psychological
stresses of reintegration may also be a severe strain on family, friendship and on neighbor
networks.
Although the returning community member may be reuniting with strong ties,
often the criminal justice system stipulates with whom the offender can associate. Prison
sanctions generally have subsequent parole conditions; jail sanctions also have
―conditions of release‖ that may include many forms of treatment plans, orders of
protection against alleged victims, and probation conditions. Since jail sanctions are
often brief, the subsequent conditions that the offender and the community must adapt to
are changes that abruptly force the offender to redefine ―normal‖ life. When the offender
cannot interact with those who are traditionally strong ties, for example family members,
the offender must attempt to reintegrate without necessary support. This places strain on
strong ties as well as community members who must become weak ties in order to
compensate for this strain. Although a returning community member may desire to join
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the economic network of that community, conventional employment is often very
difficult to obtain with a criminal record (Western 2002; Pager 2007). Even when
incarceration has been short, there is the potential for job loss, income decrease, and
difficulty obtaining new employment or replacing lost income. These strains can
exacerbate already disadvantaged or disorganized communities and lead to more crime
(Rose & Clear 1998; Clear et al., 2003; Renauer et al., 2006; Clear 2007; Hipp & Yates
2009; Taylor et al., 2009). Drawing on the above literature, my first hypothesis is that
high jail incarceration rates will decrease crime when incarceration is at low levels, but as
incarceration rates increase or become more concentrated, subsequent crime will
increase.
The procedural justice framework posits that policing and criminal justice
sanctions work to reduce crime when the community views the criminal justice system as
legitimate, fair and effective (Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Tyler & Wakslak 2004; Tyler
2003). However, when residents of marginalized communities, groups such as racial
minorities or the socioeconomically disadvantaged, are over-policed or feel as though
they are targets of the criminal justice system, the community may stop cooperating with
criminal justice actors and resort to retributive crimes to solve problems. This process,
developed in procedural justice theories, logically suggests that large levels of criminal
justice sanction will lead to increased crime in the community.
Since arrests and incarceration are so closely linked, I assume that in communities
where residents are all too familiar with criminal justice sanctions, and where crime is
still on the rise, the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system is in question. A
Longitudinal study conducted in New York concluded that communities suffering from
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extreme disadvantage, over-policing and police misconduct, had a higher violent crime
rate; researchers suggested that the higher violent crime rate was the result, in part, of
residents taking the law into their own hands (Kane 2006,) reacting violently to those
who violate a ―code of the street‖ (Anderson 1999). In California and New York
communities where police misconduct was perceived due to over-policing or perceived
racial profiling, residents lost trust in and were reluctant to cooperate with police and
viewed the criminal justice system as unfair or illegitimate (Tyler and Wakslak; 2004).
Where residents do not cooperate with the police or criminal justice system, they also
limit their formal, legitimate access to crime control agents; this naturally allows
criminals to flourish and crime to rise.
Although the current study will not be able to measure potential procedural justice
elements at work, variation in criminal justice involvement and minority population
across census tracts may pick-up on a procedural justice effect in some communities. In
communities where jail incarceration and criminal justice sanctioning are concentrated, a
subsequent higher violent crime rate may be due in part to lost trust, decreased
perceptions of legitimacy, and uncooperative residents who feel it necessary to use
violence in policing each other. Much of the research involving procedural justice has
focused on minority majority communities. This research has been particularly relevant
in better understanding policing practices such as racial profiling, police misconduct and
community trust (Tyler and Wakslak 2004; Kane 2006). Nevertheless, the procedural
justice literature provides some basis for my second hypothesis. In neighborhoods where
the community is more than 50% Latino, perceptions of criminal justice system
unfairness due to perceived over-policing or racial profiling may lead to a lack of
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cooperation with legal authorities and may make it more difficult for Latino communities
to keep crime low (Tyler and Wakslak 2004; Kane 2006). My second hypothesis is
drawn from a combination of implications based in community and procedural justice
frameworks. I hypothesize that high jail incarceration rates will increase crime where
incarceration rates are high and that this process should be particularly obvious in Latino
neighborhoods (due to some structural differences and perhaps over-policing or racial
profiling). Areas with relatively high levels of jail incarceration will be less able to
withstand the impact of incarceration and thus will have higher subsequent crime rates
than white communities with similar amounts of jail sanctions.
Deterrence and Incapacitation Suggest Sanctions Decrease Crime
In contrast to coercive mobility and procedural justice perspectives, deterrence
and incapacitation support the idea that criminal justice sanctions may decrease crime.
Traditionally the relationship between formal criminal justice sanctions, such as
incarceration, and crime has been discussed using deterrence theories. In fact, the U.S.
criminal justice system itself is largely based on the idea that formal sanctions should
deter unwanted criminal behavior (Bentham 1907). Deterrence theory suggests that most
human beings are rational actors who weigh the costs of committing a crime against
potential benefits (Becker 1968). When criminal punishment is enforced with the proper
amounts of severity, certainty, and swiftness, the threat of punishment might deter crime
in a community where the risk of punishment is known and punishment for wrong-doing
is expected by residents. Simply said, ―to be deterred is to refrain from doing something
out of fear of consequences‖ (Grasmick&Bursik; 1990). According to deterrence theory,
most humans will view the discomfort of incarceration and inconvenience or

9

embarrassment of formal sanctioning as too great a cost for the benefit of criminal
behaviors.
A common topic found in deterrence literature is that of the tipping point or
threshold; there is fairly widespread agreement that up to a point, criminal justice
sanctions deter crime but at some point this effect shifts as crime rates begin to stabilize
or increase. Therefore, although deterrence literature predicts an overall deterrent effect
of criminal justice sanctioning on subsequent criminal activity it does not claim that
sanctioning produces a permanent deterrent effect. An examination of cities and counties
in Florida led researchers to discover a critical threshold of arrests/crimes known; before
the threshold is reached, deterrence has little to no effect on subsequent crimes in the
community (Tittle & Row 1974). That is, once the percent arrested per known crimes in
Florida communities reached 30%, the crime rate in that community decreased. This
threshold suggests that the certainty of criminal justice sanction for criminal behavior is
transmitted throughout the community thus deterring future crime. A qualitative
experimental study performed in 55 Minneapolis high crime hot-spots identified a
―threshold dosage‖ of police presence necessary to produce a deterrent effect (Koper
1995). When visible crimes occurred in public, and police responded to those crimes for
a period of at least ten minutes but no more than fifteen, crime in those areas began to
decrease as opposed to areas where offenders were whisked away or where police spent
extended periods of time watching and detaining offenders. A visible, active, decisive
and fair police presence (noted by a brief but efficient police/offender interaction) in a
community had the effect of a noticeable increase in crime deterrence community-wide.
Police actions lasting longer than fifteen minutes may be overlooked and ignored by
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community members; if police actions are too quick, community members may not see
the police action at all, thus quashing potential community deterrent effects. The decline
in Minneapolis hot-spot crime was the result of appropriately timed police presence and
action that had a community-wide deterrence effect. This tipping-point or threshold
lends support to the curvilinear effect seen in coercive mobility literature. Up to a point,
coercive mobility decreases crime but then it too reaches a tipping point that may
contribute to crime increase. Recently, a longitudinal study conducted on New York
police precincts concluded that up to a point increased threat in a neighborhood
(measured as arrests per officer in a given police precinct) decreased the occurrence of
robbery and burglary in that precinct (Kane 2006). This most recent study however,
notes a tipping-point in police vigor, or threat of sanction transmitted throughout a
community. Once the tipping-point is reached, crime increases back up to its original
level, but up to that tipping point, crime decreases as a result of deterrence.
Another facet of deterrence theory is incapacitation. If the threat of punishment is
not enough to deter crime then incapacitation will at least prevent some future crimes by
removing criminals from communities into secure facilities. The use of incapacitation is
a social fail-safe that has had mixed empirical support regarding crime reduction. The
logic behind incapacitation seems simple: removing criminal offenders from a
community to a secure institution such as jail will reduce crime. Removing those
criminals who commit a large number of crimes, and are thus responsible for the bulk of
criminal activity, will even more effectively reduce crime and do so at a faster rate.
Problems with this theory arise when attempting to determine how many crimes an
individual offender is prevented from committing while incapacitated, and who the
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criminal offenders are that will be responsible for committing the most crimes (Cohen
1983). Theoretical and empirical assumptions, such as how many crimes an incarcerated
offender would be committing if not incapacitated, must be made in each test of
incapacitation. These assumptions may mean that all we really know is that people
convicted of committing a crime are not continuing to commit crimes in the community
while they are incarcerated. In this sense, incapacitation is the ultimate deterrent to
criminal activity in a community.
Most deterrence studies find little support for the deterrence hypothesis but they
acknowledge that most if not all citizens know of some legal consequences for criminal
activity; however, this knowledge does not always translate into the general public‘s
perceived likelihood of swift, severe or certain punishment for most crimes (Kleck et. al.;
2005). Although the current project focuses on macro level data and processes,
deterrence research that focuses on micro level processes aids in understanding some
underlying mechanisms that may be important in future research. For example, some
research has suggested that the era of mass imprisonment has decreased the
stigmatization of prison sanctions, or perhaps has embedded many with the perception
that prison terms are ―just a part of life‖ (Pettit and Western 2004; Clear 2007; Mauer
1999). Similar processes may be at work regarding jail sanctions. It is possible that
police action is different dependent on criminal charges or when arresting those with
warrants for lesser crimes. Perhaps if police spend more time with those who are or will
be charged with lesser crimes such as petty theft, community members view this time
spent as unnecessary thus damaging the saliency of the punishment actions. If
deterrence isn‘t effective at the individual level, then it is doubtful that deterrent
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messages are transmitted throughout the community. Research on juvenile delinquency
and deterrence does not seem to suggest that deterrence works for the younger offenders
any better than it does for their adult counterparts. An examination into the influence of
delinquent peers on perceived certainty of punishment for delinquent behavior showed
that certainty of punishment only deterred juvenile delinquency for those juveniles that
had no or few delinquent peers (Matthews and Agnew; 2008); the reasons for this are
unclear, but may suggest that the severity of punishment is not high enough to deter
misbehavior even when punishment is certain.
Recent scholarship that is pertinent to the current study examined prison
population growth for 1980-2000 in 58 Florida counties. The Florida research was a
macro-level, time-series study that looked specifically at whether or not a visible increase
in imprisonment reduced county crime rates over time. All things equal, researchers
found ―no support for the more prisoners, less crime thesis‖ suggesting that high rates of
imprisonment did not deter future criminals from engaging in criminal activity
(Kovandzic and Vieraitis; 2005). The current study will not specifically measure
deterrence in a community; however, if there are Albuquerque neighborhoods that have a
high number of incarcerations, but a lower subsequent crime rate, this may suggest that
crime decreases and stays lower in areas where many residents have experience with this
initial criminal justice sanction. Since arrest and subsequent jail incarceration is the first
step in criminal sanctioning, and because the nature of jail incarceration means that the
relocations are short-lived but with long-lasting consequences, there may be a threshold
of incarceration that can be investigated in future research to pinpoint deterrent effects.
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Figure 2, below, is a conceptual path model that depicts the two hypothesized
relationships and the expected direction of those relationships. Although the current
research cannot measure the mechanisms involved between jail and neighborhood
decline, (noted as violent crime,) prior research has suggested that there are mechanisms
that are the indirect effects of incarceration on neighborhood decline (for a review of the
mechanisms see: Lynch and Sabol 2004; Clear 2007; Clear et al., 2003; Mauer 1999).
Figure 2 Here
Data and Methods
The data used in this current study come from three sources. Crime information
(2004-2006 aggregated counts) was gathered from the Albuquerque Police Department
(APD) on 136 census tracts under the jurisdiction of APD. The Bernalillo Metropolitan
Detention Center (BMDC) is the local Albuquerque jail that serves all 141 census tracts
in Bernalillo County. BMDC provided jail booking data including offender demographic
characteristics and the most serious crime that the offender was arrested for during a
given event. Control variable measures common in social disorganization literature for
each census tract (2000) were gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau. A complete list of
variables, their measures and the data source are listed in Table 1 below.

Table1 Here
Dependent Variable
Three years of violent crimes known to the police according to the 2000 Census tracts
was obtained from the Albuquerque Police Department (APD). APD serves 136 census
tracts of the 141 total census tracts in Bernalillo County. The tracts included in the
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current analysis are limited to the 136 within APD jurisdiction. The violent crime
measure includes the sum numbers of murder, rape, sexual assault, robbery and
aggravated assaults known to the police for the years 2004-2006. During those years,
Albuquerque census tracts experienced a minimum of 3 violent crimes, a maximum of
504 violent crimes and a mean number of 111 (see graph 3 in the appendix for a
frequency distribution of 2004-2006 violent crime).
Independent Control Variables
The issue of reverse causality (simultaneity) in incarceration research is well-documented
throughout previous studies (Marvel and Moody 1994; Levitt 1996; Lynch and Sabol
2004; Hipp and Yates 2009; Taylor 2009) and is recognized in the current work. It
would be ideal to address the issue of reverse causality using longitudinal data, or by
identifying an instrumental variable (Lynch and Sabol 2004); however, for this
exploratory analysis I address the aforementioned limitations by using three sequential
time points (1996, 2000-2001, and 2004-06). The use of time points not only captures
the change experienced by communities over time, but also removes much of the direct
link between crimes at time one, incarceration at time two, and subsequent crimes at time
three. To understand how jail incarceration might affect crime in 2004-2006, it is
important to control for prior crime. This prior crime measure is the violent crime rate in
each census tract for 1996. In 1996, tracts ranged in their amount of violent crime from 0
violent crimes known to the police to 286 with a mean of 47 violent crime incidents. The
rate of violent crimes per 100,000 in 1996 ranged from 0 to 90 with a mean of 12. To
correct for the skewed distribution in the 1996 violent crime rate, the rate was then
logged (see graphs 1 and 2 in the appendix). Given the importance of the tipping-point
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found in coercive mobility as well as deterrence literatures, I also created and include in
one model of the negative binomial regression analysis a squared term of the log in
custody rate.
Neighborhood level controls: the social disorganization literature notes several variables
that should shape neighborhood crime. It would be ideal to have the census measures for
each specific year 2004-2006; however, there is little change in these measures from year
to year (Ellen and Turner 1997; Hipp et al., 2009). Social disorganization theory
highlights the importance of adverse neighborhood conditions in producing social
disorganization and subsequent heightened levels of crime. To account for neighborhood
social disorganization and economic conditions, I created a Concentrated Disadvantage
Index (CDI) (Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush 2001). The CDI is defined as: the
summed Z scores of Proportion Female Headed Households, Proportion Living below
the Poverty Level, Proportion Receiving Welfare Assistance, and Proportion
Unemployed. General residential stability in a neighborhood is known to keep crime low
due to the number and strengths of ties within the neighborhood. For this reason, I
control for general residential stability by using ―residents age 5 and older who lived in
the same residence five years ago (Residential Stability)‖ as a control for residential
stability.

Previous research has identified a relationship between crime and the

community‘s young male population. For this reason, I also control for the percentage of
young males in a tract (Young Males).
Independent Variable
Admissions data were obtained from the Bernalillo County Metropolitan Detention
center. In 2000, the BMDC provided booking data that contained 172,254 cases. Once
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the cases were reduced by removing all non-Bernalillo county addresses, transients,
homeless, refusal to answer, and prison inmates, there were 147,551 cases. Each person
ID had several addresses attached to each person/booking number. Duplicate booking
numbers were removed in order to maintain the integrity of the random representative
data. A 30% random sample was drawn thus resulting in the final number of cases of
7,802 bookings. An identical process was followed for 2001 BMDC data resulting in the
final number of 6,806 bookings. All address information from admissions records were
checked for legitimacy, then sorted by zip code and aggregated to the appropriate 2000
census tract. Addresses that could not be verified as legitimate addresses within the
Albuquerque census tracts were excluded from the study, as were addresses in Bernalillo
county that were not under the jurisdiction of the Albuquerque Police Department. Given
prior research conclusions on thresholds and dosages of criminal justice sanctions in a
community, the cut-off used in determining an area with high rates of coercive mobility
is any tract where the percent of the tract population in custody is higher than the mean of
1.2%. In order to properly compare the concept of coercive mobility across
neighborhoods, the sum number of residents in custody from a given tract was divided by
the total population, multiplied by 1000 and this value was then logged to create the ―log
in custody rate‖.
City Characteristics
The city of Albuquerque‘s demographics and structure are somewhat unique in
that it is almost a majority Latino city without the usual disadvantaged urban center. This
means that it is a prime area to investigate the differences between Latino and white
communities, but since it is unlike the typical urban metropolitan cities common in
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criminological literature (like Chicago,) it requires a bit more description. There is
substantial variation across the 136 census tracts with respect to the percent of residents
in jail custody. Two census tracts (A & B) had no residents in custody at any point 20002001. Tracts A & B can be described as affluent, majority white, and with well-educated
residents. The violent crime rate in tracts A & B was negligible in 2000 as well as in
2004-2006. The census tract with the most jail incarceration experienced 19.26% of its
tract population in jail custody throughout 2000-2001. Not surprising given years of
criminological tract level research, the census tract with the most jail incarcerations,
racial/ethnic diversity, extreme concentrated disadvantage and one of the highest crime
rates is the downtown census tract. In the downtown tract, the proportion of white
residents is .335, American Indian is .074, Hispanic is .433, Black .074, and Asian .026.
It experienced 177 violent crimes in 1996, and 504 violent crimes throughout 2004-2006.
The census tract with the highest crime rate in 2004-2006, is characterized by a
significant amount of concentrated disadvantage, a relatively large population, (I refer to
this tract as ―gangland‖ due to its high amount of gang activity known to residents, police
and watch groups), and roughly 75% of the residents are Hispanic. The crosstabulation
below (Table 2) shows the characteristics of majority Latino communities versus nonLatino communities with respect to Logged violent crime rates in 2004-2006 and percent
in custody 2000-2001. Tracts deemed to have a high proportion of Latino residents are
defined as tracts with more than 50% Hispanic residents. There are 41 tracts in the APD
tract population that are high Latino, and 95 that are low (less than 50% Hispanic). Low
v. High crime and in jail custody categories were determined using rates and percentages
above or below the mean, respectively.
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Table 2 Here
The cross tabulations found in Table 2 show that across the 136 Bernalillo county census
tracts examined, majority Latino communities have higher crime and higher incarceration
rates than their non-majority Latino counterparts. It also highlights that majority Latino
communities in Bernalillo County suffer more structural disadvantage than non-majority
Latino communities.
Jail Incarceration Characteristics
Local jails nationwide are used for a variety of criminal justice reasons; primarily,
the jail is used to contain inmates that are awaiting trial, need protective supervision due
to mental health or drug problems, or those who have been convicted of a lesser crime
and must serve a sentence of incapacitation for one year or less (Applegate et al., 2003).
Table 3 includes the related descriptive statistics on the numbers of inmates in BMDC
2000-2001 by the most serious charge (recall that this is a random 30% sample of 2000
and a 30% sample of 2001). Information on the number of prison inmates held in BMDC
awaiting court proceedings in not available in this analysis. The category ―major
felonies‖ includes inmates that are in BMDC for felony murder or material witness
charges. ―Felonies‖ is the category that includes inmates charged with non-murder 1st -4th
degree felonies; these types of felony charges in New Mexico are reserved for aggravated
assault (assaults with weapons or assaults that have been committed during the
commission of a felony level property crime, driving while intoxicated with open
containers found in vehicle, any assault against a police officer, robbery with a weapon
present, etc.) property crime that includes theft over a certain dollar amount, or damage to
property over a certain dollar amount. ―Misdemeanors‖ is the category that includes
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inmates charged with petty theft, traffic citations, domestic violence that did not result in
gross injury or was not committed with a weapon, and property damage below a specific
dollar amount. The ―warrants‖ category includes all types of warrants. Many of the
notes on the inmate‘s charges were specific to a particular Judges‘ orders (compliance
with specific conditions of release on undocumented prior charges,) however, this
category also contained warrants that were specific to traffic citations, failing to appear to
driving school, failure to pay a traffic or parking fine, alleged violation of a protective
order etc. Those inmates charged with protective custody are those whose family, friends
or neighbors were concerned for the safety of the inmate or others based on substance
abuse or mental health issues; officers arrest such inmates and hold them in the jail until
proper medical or psychiatric assessments can be performed. Generally, those inmates
being held in protective custody are not charged with a criminal act of any kind. Finally,
there were some booking numbers with attached charge notes that I could not code into
one of the specific charge categories; those that had indeterminate charges were placed
into an ―unknown charges‖ category. Regression analysis results that include controlling
for residents in custody for categories of charges are presented and discussed in the
endnotes section of this paper.i

Table 3 Here

Analytic Strategy
Following Clear et. al‘s (2003) exploratory analysis of coercive mobility in a
Florida city, the final analysis of Albuquerque census tract data was performed using a
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general linear model with a negative binomial response function. This technique allows
for better understanding the magnitude and direction of relationships between a
dependent count variable and independent controls. Given the typical overdispersion
present in Albuquerque crime variables, using a negative binomial regression
technique is appropriate. Models were run with the dispersion, or exposure, variable
―total population,‖ logged or proportion independent variables and the dependent count
crime variable. The use of the exposure variable further increases the predictive power of
the negative binomial function (Osgood 2000).
Although the current analysis of coercive mobility is cross-sectional in that it
focuses on jail incarceration at one time point (2000-2001), the analysis controls for 1996
crime, 2000 census demographic variables, and predicts 2004-2006 violent crime counts.
Recall that scholars point to problems of simultaneity in the incarceration and crime
relationship (crime likely causes incarceration and incarceration causes crime) as well as
endogeneity (an effect between incarceration and crime merely reflects a third
unmeasured variable). Nonetheless, I take measures that help to assuage concerns of
endogeneity and simultaneity that taint research on incarceration and violent crime at the
neighborhood level.

Controlling for 1996 crime rates enables me to capture

neighborhood crime trajectories prior to the jail incarceration rates. Since jail
incarcerations function as a criminal justice sanction response to crime (Applegate et al.,
2003, Kovandzic and Vieraitis 2006, Levitt 1996, Marvell and Moody 1994) it is
appropriate to capture existing levels of prior crime in a community. Using 1996 violent
crime rates may remove some of the suspicion that the incarceration rates in 2000-2001
are a direct result of prior crimes that typically would be captured in jail incarceration
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rates. That is, it is likely that jail incarceration sentences were imposed and served
sometime during 1996, 1997, or 1998 depending on when the sentencing took place for
the 1996 crime. However, this paper does not have variables to address any mechanisms
at work within the communities and it is therefore unable to thoroughly address the issue
of endogeneity.
Often jail incarceration sentences are postponed in lieu of probation and
conditions of release. Probation from an incapacitative sentence can last up to 5 years,
during which a convicted offender could be incarcerated if the probation condition(s) are
violated. The 1996 crime rates are on the border of that time-frame, however they must
suffice for this study because they are the earliest available crime rates in Albuquerque
that are tract-level. Controlling for census demographics in 2000 are the most accurate
depiction of tract-level demographic characteristics for the 2000-2001 incarceration rates.
Finally, predicting violent crime counts in 2004-2006 is also an appropriate time-lag
given the nature of jail incarceration sentences (1 year or less) together with previous
research strategies on coercive mobility (Clear 2007; Renauer et al 2006; Hipp and Yates
2009; Taylor 2009). A deterrent effect of coercive mobility may be evident if in fact
2004-2006 crime rates are lower in tracts that experienced high coercive mobility than
tracts that experienced low coercive mobility. If procedural justice or community justice
processes are more salient than deterrence, 2004-2006 crime rates should be higher in any
communities that experienced coercive mobility, but particularly obvious in communities
that experienced more coercive mobility in 2000-2001.
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After the initial evaluation of variable descriptive statistics, there was concern
regarding statistical outliers. Hat values are used to assess the potential leverage that a
variable may have in the regression model, defined as follows,

Hat values are used to determine how much leverage that a variable may have depending
on how far the independent variable value is from the mean (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch
1980). One tract had a higher than expected hat value, so further analysis of outlying
observations was conducted. In order to exhaust any potential influence that outlying
census tracts may have on the overall regression shown in Table 4, I proceeded to
examine both the CooksD values and Dfbeta values for any effects of leverage and
discrepancy. Eleven census tracts were deemed to have slightly higher than expected
CooksD values. CooksD (Cooks Distance) is a common method used for examining the
influence of a case on the overall regression results. This method measures the effect of
deleting a given observation.
The criterion to indicate high leverage (CooksD formula) is as follows:
D > 4/n

After identifying the eleven census tracts with slightly high CooksD values, I turned my
investigation to Dfbetas values. The Dfbetas is another traditional tool that is used to
assess the influence of a case. The case is considered an influential outlier if:
|dfbetas| > 2√n.
Upon thorough examination of the related Dfbetas values, only one census tract had an
abnormally high value in the primary independent variable. Any other higher dfbetas
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values were on control variables and do not affect the regression line. Therefore, models
were run with and without the census tract with identifiable leverage. In the final model
the sample size remained 136 and no tracts were dropped because there was no
significant change in any of the variables‘ strength or direction after removing the
influential tract.
The nature of the data required extensive diagnostic evaluation of multicolinearity
potential. As expected, the logged rate of crime in 1996 is highly correlated with the
number of violent crimes in 2004-2006 (.765). However, although this correlation was
the highest, the correlation between the primary independent variable jail incarceration
and crime 2004-2006 also had a strong correlation (.742) (see appendix for correlations).
For this reason, I chose to run a preliminary regression analysis using Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression for the ability to evaluate Variance Inflation
Factors (VIF) when the linear and quadratic terms for the logged in custody variable and
logged in custody square variables were both included in the analysis. The squared term
showed statistical significance once included in the OLS regression; however, the logged
in custody variable maintained direction with and without controlling for the square term.
VIFs were analyzed and remained much lower than the standard cutoff of 10.
Given the known strong colinearity between social disorganization variables,
ethnic minority measures, crime and imprisonment, an analysis of the variance inflation
factors (VIF) was performed. The mean VIF for all variables was 2.72. As expected, the
VIF for the concentrated disadvantage variable was highest at 4.75; the second highest
VIF was on the primary independent variable Rate of Residents in Jail Custody at 4.57.
Suspecting colinearity between the two variables was somewhat troubling, therefore
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another regression was performed including an interaction variable.

The interaction

variable was constructed as follows:
First, the variable rate of residents in jail custody was centered by subtracting the
mean from each observation by (InCustody - mean). The centered variable
InCustodyC was then multiplied to each respective cdi observation
(InCustodyC*cdi) = CdiJail.
Although there was not a statistically significant effect of the interaction variable between
residents in custody and concentrated disadvantage, I constructed an interaction variable
to explore other potential interaction effects. Again, using the centered rate of residents
in jail variable I constructed another interaction variable with tracts that have a high
proportion of Latino residents. Previous research would suggest that over-policing of
minority- majority communities may create such an interaction. Recall that high
proportion Hispanic is defined as census tracts where 50% or more of the residents are
Hispanic. The interaction variable is defined as (HighHispanic*centered rate of residents
in jail custody). Finally, I explored the potential interaction effect between High
Proportion Hispanic and a centered log violent crime rate 1996. Where the interaction
variable = (HighHispanic * centered logged rated of violent crime 1996). None of the
above interactions yielded statistically significant results; nor did they affect much
change in the direction or strength of any other relationships between independent
variables and the dependent variable.
Results
Table 4 presents two negative binomial regression models. Model one includes
all control variables and the primary independent variable, Log Rate of Residents in
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Custody. Based on the idea of testing for a tipping point, model two explores the
potential implications of introducing a square term for the log rate of residents in custody
to the original model.

Table 4 Here

There is very little difference between the two models therefore discussion of the results
will focus on model 2. All things equal, the variables that are statistically significant and
predict an increase in subsequent violent crime include: prior crime (Log Violent Rate
1996), rate of residents in jail custody, and the proportion of Hispanic residents in a tract.
Net of other factors, the variables that are statistically significant and predict a decrease
in subsequent crime include: proportion of foreign born residents, percent of young males
in tract and residential stability.
My first hypothesis that high jail incarceration rates will decrease crime when
incarceration is at low levels, but as incarceration rates increase or become more
concentrated, subsequent crime will increase is only partially confirmed with the first two
models. Net of all other crime and demographic characteristics in a tract the rate of
residents in custody increases subsequent violent crime. More specifically, as the jail
incarceration rate in a tract increased 1.19, there was one more violent crime in that tract.
Said another way, a 10% increase in the rate of incarcerations can predict roughly 1.5
more violent crimes. Importantly, I find no support for the idea of a tipping point across
the whole sample. Although substantively this interpretation seems quite insignificant,
when aggregated to the county level, net of other factors, this means that a 10% increase
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in the rate of incarceration throughout the county predicts roughly 204 more violent
crimes over a 3 year period. These findings are consistent with the recent conclusions
that deterrence and incapacitation do little to prevent future crime and seem to suggest
that the use of jail incarceration as a deterrent has no saliency. Future investigation into
the mechanisms driving this phenomenon in Bernalillo County should be conducted.
Table 4 provides results of the negative binomial regressions in the split sample
(table 5). In order to better understand whether or not there is a differential effect on
crime in majority-Latino versus non-majority Latino neighborhoods, I split the sample
and re-ran both above models. Following the advice of Patternoster et al., 1998, I
performed a z-test using the following formula in order to determine if there is truly a
statistically significant difference between the majority Latino and full sample
coefficients.
The formula used is defined as follows:

On the basis of the above test, the z-score is -1.83 and I can conclude that the effect of
coercive mobility on subsequent violent crime rates is different in majority Latino
communities than it is in non-majority Latino communities. Since there is a statistical
difference between the coefficients of the models, it is appropriate to present and interpret
the analysis of the majority Latino neighborhoods to that of the non-majority Latino
neighborhoods.
My second hypothesis was influenced by the literature that suggests relatively
high rates of jail incarceration increase crime and I hypothesized that this process should
be particularly obvious in Latino neighborhoods due to some structural differences,
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perhaps over-policing as well as potential racial profiling (Tyler and Wakslak 2004; Kane
2006t). Therefore, I hypothesized that areas where there are relatively high levels of jail
incarceration and a higher percentage of Hispanic residents would show an increase in
crime due to the difficulties associated with withstanding the impact of incarcerations on
community organization against crime.

Table 5 Here

Net of other factors, when a tract‘s population is 50% or more Latino, a 10%
increase in the rate of residents in custody predicts 4 more violent crimes per tract over a
three year time period. This suggests that jail incarceration does indeed differentially
affect majority Latino communities. The direction and strength of the squared term
result (-.1587) suggests that violent crime in Latino communities increases sooner as
more residents are taken into jail custody, reaches a tipping point and then seems to
stabilize. Figure 3 provides a visual description of this relationship. The difference is
interesting not only in that crime increases sooner, but that there is something about the
Latino community that facilitates a stabilization of the violent crime rate (even though
residents are still going to and from jail) as opposed to the continuing increase of violent
crimes in the non Latino communities. It is important to note that the stabilization of
violent crime in the majority Latino communities may be potentially capturing a
deterrence effect working in tandem with community mechanisms unique to majority
Latino communities. The results of the split sample regressions lend support for the
community justice and/ or the procedural justice frameworks. However, research into
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the mechanisms that contribute to the differential effects in Bernalillo County‘s Latino
communities is suggested and is discussed more thoroughly in the implications section of
this paper.
Figure 3 Here

My analysis suggests that increased levels of residents in jail custody destabilizes
communities, and differentially effects communities that are majority Latino; in some
communities coercive mobility hampers the ability for the community to organize against
future crime. The findings of the current study, although limited, have contributed to the
current debate regarding incapacitation and community safety. Not only does the pattern
of increased crime occur with prison sanctions, but the effect is similar when the
sanctions are short-lived jail sanctions. The current study also contributes to our
understanding of how majority minority communities are affected by criminal justice
sanctions within the community. The majority Latino communities in Albuquerque
suffer from structural disadvantage, higher crime and higher incarceration than their
majority white counterparts. This may explain why, at lower levels of incarceration, the
majority Latino communities‘ seem unaffected by coercive mobility, but at a certain
point of higher jail incarceration the community experiences deterrence evident by the
stabilization of subsequent predicted crime rates. In contrast, majority white
communities that are less familiar with crime and jail incarceration are ―shocked‖ into
deterrence at low levels of jail incarceration but as incarceration rates increase, the

29

sanction loses its effectiveness as a deterrent and subsequent crime rates rise as well as
remain unaffected by jail incarceration at increasing rates.
Implications for Theory and Policy
Previous research on this era of mass imprisonment and incarceration has
suggested that criminal justice sanctioning does not have the overall intended effect of
increasing community safety. The results of this current project are consistent with the
community justice (coercive mobility) and procedural justice frameworks, finding that
where jail incarceration sanctions are concentrated, subsequent crime increases. This
finding is a significant contribution in that jail incarceration is the more frequently
utilized type of incapacitation sanction compared to imprisonment, and captures many
more citizens in the ever-widening criminal justice system net. It offers support for the
coercive mobility hypothesis: that increases in incarceration destabilize community
networks and have a positive relationship to violent crime, and suggests that
criminologists have underestimated the overall community destabilization that has
occurred due to criminal justice sanctions.
I realize that many readers of this current work may be reluctant to accept the
results due to the effects of simultaneity (Marvel and Moody 1994; Levitt 1996; Lynch
and Sabol 2004; Hipp and Yates 2009; Taylor 2009). Simultaneity is a statistical bias
that occurs when the relationship between the independent variable (in the current work,
Log Incarceration Rate 2000-2001), is tested to predict the dependent variable (in the
current work, Violent Crime Rate 2004-2006) when it is also likely that the relationship
works the other way around. This bias is a significant known problem in coercive
mobility studies because some argue that higher crime inevitably causes higher
incarceration rates (Clear 2007; Marvel and Moody 1994; Hipp and Yates 2009; Lynch
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and Sabol 2004). Higher incarceration rates may also be the result of local justice system
actions that react to increasing crime by turning to the use of incapacitation sentences
(Marvell and Moody 1994). A recent scholarly work by Kevin Smith finds no support
for the traditional thoughts that increasing crime actually causes increasing prison
incarceration rates (2004; Kovandzic and Vieritis 2006). However, in this primarily
cross-sectional analysis it is difficult to dismiss simultaneity bias altogether and the
results should therefore be considered preliminary suggestio ns until they are confirmed
using a longitudinal analysis that mediates more of the simultaneity bias.
My findings parallel those found for prison incarceration. But because jail
incarceration is a more pervasive sanction it suggests that its cost for communities may
be far more extensive than previously thought. Limiting coercive mobility and other
sanction-type study to the more serious crimes and punishments (like murder and prison)
neglects the pervasive consequences of an expanding criminal justice system net.
Although the effects of coercive mobility have been most devastating to already
disadvantaged African American communities (Clear 2007; Renauer et al 2006; Hipp and
Yates 2009; Taylor 2009, Mauer 1999), this current analysis suggests that criminal justice
sanctions involving coercive mobility are impacting community safety in communities
apart from urban-ghettos.
Results of the current project also add to the debate by including the differential
effect of jail incarceration in majority Latino communities as opposed to white
communities.

To my knowledge, this is the first coercive mobility study that has

focused on investigating the difference between reactions to coercive mobility in majority
Latino and majority white communities. Two major conclusions can be drawn regarding
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the differential effects. First, Majority Latino communities experience increases in their
crime rate sooner and more dramatically after concentrated numbers of residents are
placed in jail custody than do white communities. Second, majority Latino communities‘
crime rates seem to stabilize after a certain point of residents in custody whereas this
effect is not seen in majority non-Latino communities. This finding might reflect the
redundant effect of incarceration when it is at ―ceiling levels‖ or that deterrence emanates
from high incarceration in Latino communities.
The current analysis is not equipped to draw definite conclusions regarding why
majority Latino communities show a stabilization of crime rates and majority non-Latino
communities do not; however, based on previous crime research, I suspect that this
stabilization is a result of community context as well as individual level factors
characteristic in certain ethnic communities. As noted by Ramiro Martinez Jr., in his
work on Latino Homicide (2002), Latino communities (especially those with a high
amount of recent immigrants,) may suffer from more poverty and generally have a lower
per capita income than their white counterparts, but as a result of immigration majority
Latino communities have a ―widening circle of formal and informal ties to work, and
creating or extending niches that serve all Latinos‖ (Martinez 2002; pp.138).
That is, although majority Latino communities, or ―barrios‖, aren‘t generally as
structurally advantaged as white communities, they are better-off than black urban
ghettos and may have more within-community ties that enable them to organize against
crime even better than white communities with more economic resources (Vélez 2006,
2009).
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Again, the current study cannot conclude why majority Latino communities‘
crime rates stabilize despite disadvantage and coercive mobility, but I suggest that this
result offers support to the importance of individual- level factors in a neighborhood
context. I believe that the stabilization seen in majority-Latino communities reflects the
conclusion drawn by Sampson et al., 2005: ―The lower rate of violence among Mexican
Americans compared with Whites was explained by a combination of married parents,
living in a neighborhood with a high concentration of immigrants, and individual
immigrant status.‖ That is, I suspect that the stabilization effect seen in majority-Latino
communities in this study is due, at least in part, to stronger within-community ties as
well as married parents, and a high concentration of immigrants. ii
Although the current study is limited by its cross-sectional nature, it has made a
conservative attempt to understand how jail incarceration not only affects community but
also how it differentially affects majority Latino communities. Future investigation on
jail incarceration should be longitudinal and include a larger sample of incarcerations, if
not the whole population. It would also be interesting to continue this type of analysis in
an area where the effects of jail incarceration could be included with prison incarceration
effects.
The present great recession has presented policy makers and politicians with
necessarily scaling-back economic resources devoted to incapacitating criminal
offenders. Newspaper headlines of jail closures stretch across the nation: ―Broward
closing jail space; will suspects be released?: Sheriff ‗forced‘ to reduce inmate count to
save money‖ (Wallman; 2010); ―E.St. Louis will miss deadline to submit plan for next
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budget; councilman suggests closing jail‖ (Lamb 2002). Whether or not this practice
negatively affects community safety largely rests on whether the incapacitation of lessserious criminal offenders has, to this point, positively affected community safety by
reducing crime. However, like the current research, some recent scholarship on several
cities across the United States has suggested that increased incarceration may not have
the intended effect of subsequent crime reduction. Rather, this research adds to the
chorus of those who argue that increases in criminal justice sanctioning may set in motion
processes that prevent communities from organizing to keep crime low (Rose & Clear
1998; Clear et al., 2003; George et al., 2005; Renauer et al., 2006; Clear 2007; Hipp &
Yates 2009; Taylor et al., 2009). It is both substantively and theoretically important for
criminologists to continue investigating how the era of mass imprisonment has affected
our communities in terms of crime and public safety. As many communities broach
scaling back the use of sanctions such as incarceration, the current research offers further
preliminary support for the idea that scaling back the use of jail incarceration (for those
offenders who are not the most serious criminals) yield lower levels of violent crime and
thus increase public safety.
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Appendix: Figures and Tables
Figure 1

Bureau of Justice Statistics

Figure 2: Conceptual pathways from incarceration through theoretical perspectives to crime

35

Majority Latino v. Non-Majority

300
200
0

100

Fitted values

400

Figure 3:

-2

0

2

4
Non-Majority

Latino +50%

36

6

Table 1
Variable

Variable Measure and Data S ource

Outcome Variables
Violent Crime Rate 2000-200 centered around 2000
census
Jail Incarcerations

The number of violent offenses reported to APD
(Albuquerque Police Department) for each tract year divided
by the tract population and multiplied by 1,000 each year
Addresses of persons sent to jail in a given tract year (20002001) are geocoded to corresponding census tract, divided
by the tract population and multiplied by 1000. Data
gathered from the Bernalillo M etro Detention Center.

Control Variables

Race/Ethnicity of tract

Offender‘s race/ethnicity in a given tract year (2000-2001)
Data gathered from the Bernalillo M etro Detention Center.
Offender‘s gender in a given tract year (2000-2001) Data
gathered from the Bernalillo M etro Detention Center.
Offender‘s birthdate subtracted from their booking date
(2000-2001). Data gathered from the Bernalillo M etro
Detention Center.
M ost serious type of crime that offender was arrested for
(jail) in given tract year for each booking event (2000-2006).
Data gathered from the Bernalillo M etro Detention Center.
Racial composition of census tracts (US Census)

Percent living below the poverty level in tract

(US Census)

Percent Divorced in tract

(US Census)

Percent with High School Diploma in tract

(US Census)

Percent Unemployed in tract

(US Census)

Percent Foreign Born in tract

(US Census)

M edian home value in tract
Residential stability as the percent of residents who have
stayed in their residence for the last five years

(US Census)

Race/Ethnicity of Offenders
Gender of Offenders
Age of Offender

Type of Crime

(US Census)
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Table 2: Crosstabulation of Community Ethnic Characteristics
Non-Majority Latino

Majority Latino

84.3%

26.4%

15.7%

73.6%

84.3%

28.3%

15.7%

71.7%

Low CDI Score

80.00%

16.00%

High CDI Score

20.00%

84.00%

Low Violent Crime Rate
Community
High Violent Crime Rate
Community
Low Number in Jail
Custody
High Number in Jail
Custody
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std.
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Sum Violent Crime 2004-2006
Logged Sum Violent Crime 2004-2006
Independent In-Custody/Incarceration
Variable
Rate of Residents in Jail Custody 2000-2001

3
1.10

504
6.22

111.23
4.3159

97.713
.97111

.00

385.24

23.5146

37.02653

Logged Rate of Residents in Jail Custody

-.95

5.95

2.6302

1.05344

.00
-.90
.000
.000

90.06
4.50
.159
.137

11.8104
1.9795
.02883
.02927

11.97606
1.13679
.023440
.026094

.015
.007
1.21
-1.33

.904
.357
17.16
1.62

.40201
.08075
3.5891
-.0245

.217017
.062228
1.63604
.67826

.056

.708

.49302

.143523

.00

3

.3235

.66536

Inmates in jail for a felony
Inmates in jail for a misdemeanor
Inmates in jail for a warrant/administrative
violation

.00
.00

96
237

12.6103
35.2059

15.29811
40.96523

.00

331

51.1029

53.24747

Inmates in jail under protective custody

.00

13.00

.5956

1.40570

Inmates in jail but no charge identified

.00
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.8235

4.83641

Dependent Variable

Independent Control Variables
Violent Crime Rate 1996
Logged Violent Crime Rate 1996
Proportion non-Hispanic Black Population
Proportion non-Hispanic Am. Indian
Population
Proportion Hisp./Latino population
Proportion of population who are foreign born
Percent in tract that are Males 15-19 years old
CDI (concentrated disadvantage index)
Proportion of population age 5+ residing in
same house 5 years ago
Inmates in jail for a major felony

136.00

Valid N Listwise
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Table 4: Negative Binomial
Regression on Violent Crime
2004-2006

Model 1
b

Model 2
SE

b

SE

Log Violent Rate 1996

.4362211**

.0346854

.4354676**

.0348291

Log Rate of Residents in Custody

.1782109**

.042841

.188777**

.0612198

Proportion of Hispanic Residents

1.130504**

.189413

1.125605**

.1905352

Proportion of Black Residents
Proportion of American Indian
Residents
Proportion Foreign Born
Residents

2.440099

1.283144

2.452375

1.283834

1.722843

1.406739

1.732936

1.410651

-1.680603**

.5295147

-1.68658**

.5295076

Percent of Young Males in tract

-.0653622**

.0159746

-.0657874**

.0160717

Residential Stability

-1.355407**

.2335416

-1.355619**

.2335813

Concentrated Disadvantage Index
Square term: Log Rate of
Residents in Custody

-.0320481

.0756984

-.0274442

.0780454

-.0038113

.01575

-4.735014

.1974357

Total Population (exposure)
Constant

-4.725457

N

136

Α

.0647004

-2Log Likelihood

1229.610

.1935201

136
.0099286

.0646816
1229.551

p<.05* p<.01**
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.0099257

Table 5 : Negative Binomial Regression on
Violent Crime 2004-2006 Split Sample by
Proportion Hispanic

Tract is 50% or more
Hispanic Model 1

Tract less than 50% Hispanic
Model 2

Log Violent Rate 1996

.3637191**

.061645

.4174718**

0.0453169

Log Rate of Residents in Custody

.9667441*

.4353858

.2450774**

0.0685056

Proportion of Black Residents

7.756508**

1.784348

-1.823465

2.300121

Proportion of American Indian Residents

-1.726488

0.459057

1.289019

1.970653

Proportion Foreign Born Residents

-0.136225

.6116223

-1.763889

1.138486

Percent of Young Males in tract

-.0298948

.0258

-.0861761**

.0213862

Residential Stability

-.8647757*

.3759075

-1.389147**

.3034921

Concentrated Disadvantage Index

.0007919*

.0896165

.1765274

.1408541

Square term: Log Rate of Residents in Custody

-.1587738^

.0862132

-.0198827

.0203388

Constant

-6.198403

.9573087

-4.177939

2.638049

N

41

95

Α

.0306153

.0859332

-2Log Likelihood

392.83134

827.98324

Total Population (exposure)

p = .066 ^ p<.05 * p<.01**
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Spearman’s Rho Correlation Matrix

Violent Crime 20042006
Logged Violent
Crime Rate1996
Logged Rate of
Residents in Custody
(Logged Rate of
Residents in
Custody) Squared
Proportion Hispanic
Proportion NonHispanic Black
Proportion NonHispanic American
Indian
Proportion Foreign
Born
Percent Young Male

Residential Stability
Concentrated
Disadvantage Index

Correlation
Coefficient
Sig.(1tailed)
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig.(1tailed)
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig.(1tailed)
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig.(1tailed)
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig.(1tailed)
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig.(1tailed)
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig.(1tailed)
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig.(1tailed)
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig.(1tailed)
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig.(1tailed)
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig.(1tailed)

Violent
Crime
20042006
1.000

Logged
Violent
Crime
Rate1996
.765 **

Logged
Rate of
Residents
in Custody
.742 **

(Logged
Rate of
Residents
in
Custody)
Squared
.705 **

.

.000
1.000

.000
.694 **

.

Proportion
Hispanic
.667 **

Proportion
NonHispanic
Black
.346 **

Proportion
NonHispanic
American
Indian
.566 **

Proportion
Foreign
Born
.566 **

Percent
Young
Male
-.044

Residential
Stability
-.218 **

Concentrated
Disadvantage
Index
.764 **

.000
.683 **

.000
.483 **

.000
.286 **

.000
.475 **

.000
.487 **

.307
.030

.005
-.099

.000
.756 **

.000
1.000

.000
.974 **

.000
.684 **

.000
.179 *

.000
.446 **

.000
.550 **

.365
.010

.125
.047

.000
.771 **

.

.000
1.000

.000
.643 **

.019
.163 *

.000
.405 **

.000
.547 **

.455
.009

.292
.046

.000
.761 **

.

.000
1.000

.029
.118

.000
.293 **

.000
.502 **

.458
.170 *

.297
.107

.000
.687 **

.

.085
1.000

.000
.475 **

.000
.073

.024
-.003

.107
-.461 **

.000
.334 **

.

.000
1.000

.198
.215 **

.485
-.130

.000
-.474 **

.000
.540 **

.

.006
1.000

.065
-.009

.000
-.090

.000
.555 **

.

.459
1.000

.148
.091

.000
.140

.

.147
1.000

.052
-.185 *

.

.016
1.000
.

p<.05* p<.01**
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Endnotes
i

To my knowledge this investigation of coercive mobility due to jail incarceration is the

first of its kind and as such I felt that it was important to investigate coercive mobility by
types of criminal charges. I thought that breaking-down the incarceration rates into
incarceration for a specific category of crimes might better explain some of the variation
in subsequent crime rates. The felony, misdemeanor and warrants categories account for
roughly 98% of the jail incarceration charges in 2000-2001. Negative binomial
regressions were performed with all controls and one of the incarceration categories in
each model. Breaking down the incarceration rates into rates of incarceration for specific
categories of crimes did not explain any more of the variation in predicted violent crime
2004-2006.
Endnote Models Here

ii

After obtaining the result that shows the stabilization of violent crime in majority-

Latino communities, (figure 3), I examined the proportion of foreign born residents in
Albuquerque census tracts as well as the crime and proportion female-headed household
characteristics of tracts where foreign born residents are more than 10% (that is, high
foreign born tracts have a proportion higher than the mean). This was done in order to
investigate whether or not Albuquerque tracts with majority-Latino residents are similar
to those described by Martinez (2002) and Sampson et al., (1997 and 2005). The
similarities are confirmed: 56.1% of the tracts with a high foreign born population are in
44

tracts that are majority Latino. 77.3% of the tracts that have a high foreign born
population have low (less than 50%) female-headed households. Such similarities
suggest that majority-Latino neighborhoods in Albuquerque have stronger strong ties and
more numerous weak ties that enable them to better re-organize against crime in the face
of concentrated coercive mobility and economic disadvantage.

Endnote Models: Negative Binomial Regression on Violent Crime 2004-2006 Controlling for
Incarceration Charge Type

Log Violent Crime
Rate 1996
Proportion
Hispanic
Proportion Black
Proportion
American Indian
Proportion Foreign
Born
Percent Young
Male
Residential
Stability
Concentrated
Disadvantage Index
Log Rate Felonies
Log Rate
Misdemeanors
Log Rate Warrants
Constant
Total Population
(exposure)
alpha
p<.05* p<.01**

Model 1
b
SE
.4669474**
.0350866

Model 2
b
SE
.4330916**
.0347995

Model 3
b
SE
.4355416**
.0340922

1.368521**

.188704

1.100157**

.1908769

1.147783**

.1828466

3.250296*
2.537769

1.310988
1.479107

2.433146
1.742278

1.278737
1.408221

2.26467
1.899059

1.272109
1.376627

-1.686645**

.5753663

-1.662336**

.5297017

-1.620279**

.5236261

-.0682696**

.0167323

-.0584194**

.0161764

-.0670649**

.0157832

-1.163898**

.2381569

-1.31508**

.2304143

-1.377419**

.2299425

.0189745

.0803841

-.0166004

.0741507

-.0579951

.075505

.0102805

.0062864
.1822567**

.0430612

-4.573018**

.1978984

-4.592848**

.1883397

.24438**
-4.788828**

.0512488
.1926854

.0719389

.0109272

.0642053

.0099

.0623577

.0095983
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